An effective risk management process enables a bank's management to measure and monitor risk, generate credible data, use sophisticated tools and provide fair value estimates, potentially of higher quality. Although the actual risk management process is unobservable to outsiders, disclosure relating to the risk management activities and corporate governance that monitors it reveals its effectiveness to the market participants. Using the association between stock returns and fair value gains and losses (FVGL) as a measure of the quality of the fair value estimates, this paper investigates whether the FVGL-returns association is a function of disclosure and corporate governance for a sample of 180 US commercial banks for the period [2003][2004][2005]. I find that disclosure has a positive effect on the FVGL-returns association. The effect of corporate governance is more subtle and indirect through the medium of disclosure. Analysis by type of risk shows that the impact of disclosing modeling of interest rate risk, credit risk and derivatives risk on the FVGL-returns association is increasing in the bank's exposure to these risks. Overall, evidence suggests that disclosure aids market participants directly, whereas corporate governance aids market participants indirectly (via disclosures) in evaluating the quality of fair value estimates.
Introduction
The debate surrounding the quality of fair value estimates continues as firms are expected to expand the use of fair values under SFAS No. 159 and fair value related disclosure under SFAS No. 157.
This paper examines whether the quality of fair value estimates of financial instruments provided by management increases with the effectiveness of the risk management process within a bank. Management develops fair value estimates based on data inputs, risk measurements tools, and estimation models which are a part of a broader risk management process. Thus, the effectiveness of the risk management processes would be a significant driver of the quality of fair value estimates. Although the actual risk management process is not observable directly, disclosure about the risk management process and corporate governance that constrains management to follow an optimal risk management process has the potential to reveal its quality and hence, the quality of fair value estimates to market participants. 1 This paper uses disclosure and corporate governance as proxies for the effectiveness of the bank's risk management. The slope coefficient relating returns to fair value gains and losses (FVGL) based on the disclosed fair value estimates is adopted as a proxy for the market's perception of the quality of those fair value estimates. I predict and find that the FVGL-returns association increases with the level of disclosure and the level of corporate governance for a sample of 180 US commercial banks for the period 2003-
2005.
The current accounting model in the US is a mixed attribute model, which uses both historical costs and fair values. While certain financial instruments are recognized at fair values on the balance sheet, the fair values of others are disclosed in footnotes. 2 Proponents of fair value accounting argue that fair values reflect current economic conditions and are therefore more relevant than historical costs in describing 1 Risk management, corporate governance, and disclosure are interlinked and crucial to maintaining the confidence of capital and financial markets (Bies 2002) 2 Trading securities, derivatives, and hedged items under fair value hedges, are recognized at fair values. Fair values of investments held to maturity, loans, deposits, borrowings and off balance sheet items are disclosed. financial instruments. However, fair values are not always easily ascertainable or interpretable. 3 
SFAS
No. 157 identifies a hierarchy to rank the reliability of the inputs used in estimation of fair values. Fair values may be based on direct market quotes (Level 1). They may also be based on observable inputs such as market quotes of similar financial instruments or inputs that a market participant would use when financial instruments lack a ready market (Level 2) or unobservable inputs (Level 3). Even if market price exists, it can deviate from fundamental value. Thus, fair values can be educated estimates that often involve considerable judgment, thereby introducing the possibility of measurer bias (intentional) and measurement bias (unintentional) in the estimates. In addition, because financial instruments are often risky, realized values often differ from estimated fair values. These concerns about reliability are often cited by academic scholars to explain mixed evidence relating to the ‗value relevance' of fair values and by regulators in discussions relating to fair values (see Barth 1994; Nelson 1996; Bies 2004a ). Volatility, caused by the risk underlying a financial instrument, and judgment bias, give rise to reliability concerns (Ryan 2002; Barth 2006) . Thus, use of fair values can introduce noise and/or bias that reduces accounting quality (Barth 2006; Landsman 2006; Nissim and Penman 2007) .
Scholars and regulators often cite the potential for disclosure to influence the interpretation of fair values (Ryan 2002; Barth 2006; Landsman 2006; Bies 2006; and Basel Committee 2005) . By themselves, point estimates of fair values are meaningless unless supplemented by additional disclosure -such as of key drivers affecting valuations, range estimates, and confidence levels. These additional disclosures give users of financial statements a better understanding of the relative quality of fair value estimates (Bies 2004a ). Equally important is the broader set of disclosures. These reveal how management identifies and analyzes risks; and how it monitors and measures risk using sensitivity analyses, stress tests, or scenario analyses. Strong risk measurement improves the communication between the institution and the market participants as well as the integrity of the information provided to investors (Bies 2004b) . For example, in banks, where the discipline of risk management is well developed, a point estimate of fair value can show that the fair value of a loan portfolio is $100 million and has dropped $10 million from the previous report. However, if the bank is forthcoming about risk management information (such as interest rate risk, credit quality of the loan portfolio, and the range of values the portfolio would take under alternative future scenarios) the user of the financial statements could determine whether changes in value were due to poor credit quality, changes in interest rates, or simply sales or loan payoffs. Without such disclosure, market participants will be unable to perceive the level of effectiveness of the risk management process and the relative quality of financial information, including the fair value estimates.
Similarly, corporate governance plays a role in enhancing and/or revealing the quality of fair value estimates. Corporate governance and risk management cut across all functional areas in a bank and are interrelated. Risk management cannot be effective in the absence of the monitoring role of corporate governance; it is a tool in the governance mechanism itself (Basel Committee 2005) . Sound corporate governance and strong risk management process provide management with data and tools to better monitor and measure risk and estimate fair value. However, in addition to providing fair value estimates, management also makes disclosure decisions. It is the governance structure that constrains management to follow the optimal disclosure policy (Core 2001) . Thus, the monitoring role of corporate governance could be evident directly in the higher quality of fair value estimates. It could be also evident in a more subtle and indirect way, through informative disclosure practices which give meaning to the fair value estimates. Despite these arguments, the potential role of disclosure and corporate governance in mitigating concerns relating to reliability, and enhancing the quality of fair value estimates, is yet to be explored empirically.
The empirical analyses I conducted involved the construction of a measure of FVGL based on fair value estimates disclosed under SFAS No. 107. One must appreciate that net income (NI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) are no longer based entirely on historical costs and include some, but not all fair value gains and losses. 4 I measure the quality of fair value estimates as the coefficient arising from a regression of stock returns on the disclosed FVGL. This coefficient is often interpreted as a joint measure of relevance and reliability. I construct a measure of disclosure intended to capture the risk management process of the bank. The disclosure measure is based on 92 individual items relating to capital structure, capital adequacy, market risk internal modeling, internal and external ratings, credit risk modeling, securitization activities, asset quality, credit derivatives and other credit enhancements, derivatives (other than credit derivatives), geographic and business line diversification, accounting and presentation policies and other risks. I use the total composite disclosure measure (DIP) and alternatively a ranked measure (DIPRANK). I use two proxies for corporate governance. The first measure is Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). This is a composite measure of corporate governance computed by Institutional Shareholder Services and is intended to capture corporate governance dimensions aligned closely with firm performance and risk mitigation. CGQ is based on various governance dimensions, such as board structure and composition, audit issues, charter and by-law provisions, laws of incorporation, executive and director compensation, qualitative factors, stock ownership, and director education. The second measure captures the independence of the Board of Directors (IND). To the extent that disclosure and corporate governance improve the ability of market participants to assess the fair value estimates, I would expect the valuation of fair values to increase, as reflected in the FVGL-returns association.
To account for the potential endogenous relation between corporate governance and disclosure, I
estimate a regression of disclosure on corporate governance, controlling for other determinants of disclosure. I use the combined findings from the two tests -the relation between corporate governance and disclosure, and the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on the FVGL-returns association, to document the total effect of corporate governance. 5 The total effect of corporate governance is the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect via disclosure. Results show that the FVGL-returns association is increasing in the level of disclosure. Tests measuring the relation between corporate governance and disclosure show that after controlling for other determinants of disclosure, corporate governance and disclosure also related positively. Although there is modest evidence of the direct effect of corporate governance on the FVGL-association, results suggest mostly an indirect effect via disclosure.
I conduct additional tests to investigate specific disclosure by type of bank. The activities undertaken by banks and the risks they take are not homogenous. I use sub-categories of the disclosure measure (interest rate risk modeling disclosure, credit risk modeling disclosure and derivative risk modeling disclosure) to capture risk management activities relating to the three main risk groups (interest rate risk, credit risk and derivatives risk respectively). I control for the type of bank by risk exposure (exposure to high interest rate risk, credit risk, and derivatives exposure, respectively). Results confirm there is a positive effect of disclosure on the FVGL-returns association for each of the three types of risks.
Together, the results suggest that for the sample banks during the study period, disclosure aids market participants directly, whereas corporate governance aids market participants indirectly, in evaluating fair values. These findings are especially relevant as fair value accounting is being used increasingly in the US and other countries. 6 They suggest that users of financial statements, including regulators and market participants should find disclosures and corporate governance aid in evaluating the fair values. The evidence in this paper supports the continuous effort of the FASB to enhance disclosure relating to fair values (such as SFAS No. 157) and the effort by regulators and banking supervisors to encourage sound corporate governance practices. The findings contribute to the existing research in fair values, disclosure and corporate governance. Prior research relating to fair values has attributed the lack of evidence supporting the relevance of fair values to estimation errors, and has hinted at potential management bias. This paper provides empirical evidence to support arguments emphasizing the role of disclosure and corporate governance. The paper accounts for the endogenous relation between disclosure and corporate governance, and explores disclosure as a mediating variable through which the monitoring role of corporate governance may be evident.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior research literature, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and measurement of variables. Section 4 discusses the model and the results. Section 5 conducts additional analyses of risk and includes robustness checks. In Section 6, the results are summarized, and potential avenues for future research are highlighted.
Literature Review and Empirical Predictions

Prior literature
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has mandated several accounting standards that require use of fair values. 7 Fair values meet most of qualitative characteristics of useful financial statement information (Barth 2006 8 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 2 discusses the qualitative characteristics of the accounting information viz. relevance, reliability, comparability, consistency and materiality. Barth (2006) points out that in addition to be relevant, fair values are comparable because it is the price at which an asset or liability could be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, unrelated willing parties. Thus, it is not information and is untimely in measuring assets and liabilities (Ryan 2002) . Fair values incorporate current information and are better predictors of future earnings for financial instruments. The most significant concern is that fair value estimates may not be reliable as they are highly volatile and prone to measurer bias and measurement bias. Several studies in accounting have examined the value relevance of FVGL and fair value level estimates relating to investments, loans, deposits, debt and derivatives.
9
Regarding fair value estimates of investment securities, Barth (1994) and Khurana and Kim (2003) find that equity value is positively associated with fair value estimates of investment securities. However, the information in fair value estimates is not necessarily incremental to the information in historical cost estimates, especially after controlling for accounting profitability, growth in book value; etc. (Barth 1994; Petroni and Wahlen 1995; Barth et al. 1996; Nelson 1996; Eccher et al. 1996; and Park et al. 1999) .
Evidence relating to FVGL is mixed due to measurement error and the omission of correlated unrealized gains and losses on other assets and liabilities (Barth 1994; Ahmed and Takeda 1995; Park et al. 1999 ).
Regarding fair value estimates of loans, Barth et al. (1996) conclude that the disclosed fair values contain incremental information. On the other hand, Nelson (1996) finds no incremental information at all, whereas Eccher et al. (1996) , Park et al. (1999), and Nissim (2003) find evidence of incremental information only in specific settings. Barth et al. (1996) and Nissim (2003) provided evidence that banks -manage‖ the disclosed fair value of loans consistent with the arguments relating to lack of reliability arising from considerable managerial discretion. In contrast, but consistent with signaling motivation, Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003) find that pricing multiples on the discretionary component of loan fair values are higher than those on the non-discretionary component. There is very little information relating to fair value of deposits as management is not required to disclose the fair value estimates of deposits that dependent on the entity , which may hold the asset or the liability. Fair values reflect the same type of information in every period and thereby make the information consistent across time periods. Fair values are timelier than historical costs because they reflect current economic conditions. 9 Besides the ‗value relevance' literature, there is a second stream of literature which looks at the ‗risk relevance' of fair value based earnings. For a detailed review, refer to Bhat (2008). do not have a defined maturity. This is reflected in empirical research which does not find that fair values of deposits are relevant incremental to historical costs (Barth et al. 1996; Eccher et al. 1996; Nelson 1996; and Park et al. 1999; Khurana and Kim 2003) . Results relating to fair values of debt are mixed. On one hand Barth et al. (1996) find that the disclosed fair value of debt explains share prices of banks, incremental to historical costs. In contrast, Nelson (1996) and Eccher et al. (1996) do not find the estimated fair value of debt to have any additional explanatory power after controlling for historical cost.
Evidence relating to fair value estimates for derivatives mostly suggests that fair values of derivatives are not relevant (e.g., Barth et al. 1996 , Eccher et al. 1996 Nelson 1996; Park et al. 1999; and Simko 1999) .
One exception is Venkatchalam (1996) who documents that market participants perceive derivatives' fair values as relevant. But fair values of derivatives are particularly questionable because estimation technology and markets for these instruments are only developing. Wong (2000) argues and finds that the estimation error inherent in derivatives' fair values makes notional amounts incrementally relevant.
Overall, evidence suggests that fair value estimates are relevant in levels, but evidence relating to FVGL is mixed.
The most compelling reason, which may explain this mixed or rather lack of evidence relating to the FVGL-returns association, is the reliability concern. Reliability concern arises from the risky nature of financial instruments, which often cause realized values to deviate from estimates, and the considerable management discretion involved in the estimation process. The FASB requirements (to recognize or disclose an item) themselves send a signal to the market participants about information's relevance and/or reliability. Empirical studies show that prices partially ignore note disclosure, relative to the expected effect (Harris and Ohlson 1987; Landsman and Ohlson 1990) . In addition, the market participant's inability or limited ability to process footnote disclosure due to cognitive costs or limitations (Hodge et al. 2002 ) potentially contribute to this mixed evidence. If a bank has a strong risk management process and is forthcoming with information that will make the fair value estimates more meaningful, the users of financial statements will have a better understanding of the relative quality of fair value estimates.
Effect of Disclosure
I expect that disclosure reveals the quality of the fair value estimates to market participants. Therefore, disclosure explains the cross-sectional variation in the FVGL-returns association. This prediction follows the view of regulators and scholars in relation to fair values, and prior theoretical research relating to disclosure. I argue that there are three ways in which disclosure potentially affects the FVGL-returns association. 10 First, higher quality of disclosure implies lower discount rates through the reduction of information asymmetry component of the cost of capital (Leuz and Verrechia 2000 , Lambert et al. 2007 , Easley and O' Hara 2004 . In the context of fair value estimates, management provides fair value estimates based on data, models and judgment within the framework of the risk management process of the bank. The inputs for developing the fair value estimates range from quoted market prices to internal valuation models based on management assumptions.
11 Managers have private information regarding model inputs as well the true underlying economic value of a financial instrument to the firm (Landsman 2006) . This informational asymmetry would be especially severe in the case of fair value estimates based on assumptions and creates the problem of adverse selection. In the absence of information, market participants will be unable to distinguish a firm with a higher quality portfolio and more reliable fair value estimates from a firm which does not. Market participants need disclosure to understand how management developed fair value estimates within the risk management process, and to ascertain the sensitivities of the firm's assets and liabilities to changing economic conditions (type of risk, speculator or a hedger, etc.). Empirical evidence suggests that disclosures, such as interest-rate gap, notional amounts of derivatives, and market-risk disclosures are viewed by the market as risk relevant (e.g., 10 My arguments follow Hope and Thomas (2008) and Hope et al. (2008) who point out that theoretical research provides at least three arguments to support the link between disclosure and the pricing of an earnings variable.
11 Fair value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement. Therefore, management has to estimate fair value based on the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. Schrand 1997 , Ahmed et al. 2004 Second, if the firm is not forthcoming, it imposes additional information acquisition costs on market participants, and thereby increases the required rate of return (Kim 1993; Diamond 1985) .
Enhanced disclosure enables firms to obtain funds at risk premiums that more accurately reflect their lower risk profiles (Bies 2003) . If market participants are unable to perceive their fundamental financial strength and sound risk-management practices, such firm would be penalized.
Third, price reaction to information is related negatively to noise in information (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988) . Thus, to the extent that disclosure reduces the noise, it enhances the price response. If the firm is not forthcoming, market participants will be unable to undo the noise in the estimate. Greater 12 SFAS No. 157 requires disclosure of fair value amounts at the end of each accounting period (year, quarter), how the fair values are determined, the effect on income arising from each particular class of assets or liabilities (i.e. separate disclosure of recognized and unrecognized gains and losses), and the hierarchy of the inputs.
13 I capture some elements of estimation sensitivity in the disclosure index. Ideally, estimation sensitivity should be a category in the disclosure index. However, the disclosures specifically relating to fair value computation -models, assumptions ,etc. are boiler plate. There is almost no variation in the note disclosure relating to SFAS No. 107 except for the top five banks. This will change under the expanded disclosures required under the newly mandated SFAS No. 157. Detailed analysis of estimation sensitivity is an avenue for future research. uncertainty exists regarding the ‗true values' when information is low. Although fair value estimates may be relevant, they would have little use in valuation if they are unreliable.
Overall, the arguments made by regulators, and academicians suggest that disclosure aids market participants in understanding fair values in the context of the risk management process. By disclosing information relating to the risk management process, a firm can presumably distinguish the higher quality of its risk management process. As a result, the firm has lower discount rates, resulting in a positive link between disclosure and FVGL-returns association. This leads to my first hypothesis (in alternative form):
H1: FVGL-returns association is positively related to the level of disclosure.
Despite these arguments, disclosure may not enhance the FVGL-returns association. First, disclosure could merely increase information and increased information need not necessarily translate into higher transparency. Transparency involves placing that information into meaningful contexts (Greenspan 2003) . This is particularly relevant to banks because they have high risk exposures and complex operations. Second, market participants may not view disclosure as credible or may misconstrue information. Third, in some cases disclosure may reveal the risk exposure to be higher than expected and cause market participants to apply higher discount rates. The above mentioned arguments introduce noise and work against finding positive effect of disclosure. Thus, disclosure may have no effect on FVGLreturns association.
Effect of Corporate Governance
I expect that corporate governance enhances or reveals the quality of the fair value estimates to the market participants, and therefore explains the cross-sectional variation in the FVGL-returns association.
This prediction follows from agency theory and the view of regulators. There are three ways in which corporate governance potentially affects the quality of the fair value estimates.
First, corporate governance may minimize the (intentional) measurer bias. Agency theory argues that corporate governance and accounting information are linked (Bushman and Smith 2001; Sloan 2001) .
In the context of fair values, the private information managers have about the model inputs and underlying economic value of financial instruments, gives rise to the problem of moral hazard (Landsman 2006) . Managers will tend to use private information to their advantage by manipulating the information they disclose to market participants and regulators, thereby increasing measurer bias in the fair value estimates. Because management actions or credibility are not observable directly, it is plausible that market participants judge the quality of fair value estimates based on the corporate governance mechanisms that monitor management. Although, empirical evidence relating to the monitoring role of corporate governance in ensuring financial reporting quality in public firms (largely non-financial) has been mixed, Larcker et al. (2007) argue that it is difficult to conceive a situation where corporate governance is not relevant for understanding managerial behavior and organizational performance. They attribute the mixed evidence to measurement bias and construct issues relating to governance variables.
Second, corporate governance affects the measurement bias through its effect on the risk management process. It is a long standing regulatory assumption that sound corporate governance implies a sound risk management process (Bies 2006; Basel Committee 2005) . Effective risk management process provides management with high quality data and tools to estimate fair values and minimize (unintentional) measurement error. Among the numerous empirical papers that explore the role of corporate governance, Brown and Caylor (2005) provide evidence relating to corporate governance, firm valuation and firm risk. They find that poorly governed firms have lower valuations, more risk, and more stock price volatility.
Third, the monitoring role of corporate governance extends to disclosures. Disclosure is an input in the corporate governance of a firm, as well as an output of the corporate governance structure of the firm.
Disclosure is one of the corporate governance mechanisms used by outsiders to monitor management (Sloan 2001) . At the same time, the monitoring role of corporate governance is not limited merely to the accounting numbers, but extends to disclosure. It is the governance structure that constrains the manager to follow the optimal disclosure policy (Core 2001) . Empirical evidence investigating disclosure and corporate governance largely suggests a positive association (Beekes and Brown 2006; Leung and Horwitz 2004) . Thus, the monitoring role of corporate governance may not be limited to reliable fair value estimates, but a concurrent outcome may potentially be high quality disclosure that helps market participants assess the fair values in the context of risk. Corporate governance may impact the FVGLreturns association through the medium of disclosure. This leads to my second and third hypotheses (in alternative form):
H2: The FVGL-returns association is positively related to the level of corporate governance.
H3: Disclosure is a function of the level of corporate governance.
Despite the above arguments, corporate governance may not moderate the FVGL-returns association. First, corporate governance in banks has unique characteristics that distinguish it from other non-financial public firms. Banks are highly levered and typically receive 60-80 percent or more of their funding from deposits, unlike non-financial firms. Macey and O'Hara (2003) argue that the incentive for monitoring through governance mechanisms may be reduced due to the protection offered by deposit insurance and the highly regulated nature of the banking industry. Second, unlike NI, FVGL, is not recognized, but disclosed. Management incentives to bias information, as well as market participant's perception of the information, may differ between recognized and disclosed components (Hodge et al. 2002; Ahmed et al. 2006; Beaver and Venkatchalam 2003; Holthausen and Watts 2001) . The above mentioned arguments work against finding a positive effect of corporate governance on FVGL-returns.
Data and Variable Measurement
Fair values are disclosed by all firms. However, I choose to study commercial banks for two reasons. First, the balance sheets of commercial banks comprise mostly financial instruments. Therefore, fair values are very relevant to them. Second, choosing a sample belonging to one industry may mitigate concerns relating to cross-sectional differences in sample firms. Third, the cost of hand collecting data limits my sample size.
Sample Selection
The sample comprises US bank holding companies ( annual report with SEC, (iii) stock information on the CRSP file, (iv) fair value income information on the SNL database, and (v) corporate governance information in the ISS dataset. 14 Panel A of Table 1 presents shows that intersecting these five datasets yield 180 firms with 492 firm-year observations. 
Descriptive Statistics
Bank Characteristics
Descriptive statistics, presented in panel C of table 1, reveal considerable variation in firm size. The sample banks cover a broad range with market capitalization of $25 million to $248 billion with a mean of $3.7 billion. The mean (median) return on total assets, NI scaled by average assets, is 1.15% (1.12%). This is consistent with other studies using banking samples (Hodder et al. 2006 ). On average, fair value of net assets ($1.8 billion) is higher than the book value of net assets ($1.7 billion). The main source of difference is loans, borrowings and off-balance sheet derivatives. Investments for banks are mostly trading investments and investments available for sale; the related fair values are already accounted in the balance sheet. The current fair value requirements for deposits do not require fair values of demand deposits. Hence deposits do not constitute a major source of disclosed fair values. The mean (median) NI and FVGL (scaled by beginning of year market value) are 6.87% (6.92%) and -1.61% (-0.63%). The variation in OCI is relatively small and ranges from -8.39% to 4.67% at the maximum. Compared to NI and OCI, FVGL varies significantly (across firms and time). The standard deviation for NI is 2.58% and 14 Annual reports are available for the public holding company rather than the commercial bank subsidiary. The choice of the period is driven by two considerations-the SFAS No. 133 was effective in 2001 which changed the FVGL that was recognized in NI, and the SOX was implemented in 2002, potentially affecting governance of the sample firms. 15 Sample size is similar to other banking studies. For example : Hodder et al. (2006) have a similar sample size of 202 publicly listed banks the standard deviation for FVGL is 10.56%. The variability of fair value income (FVI) which includes NI, OCI and FVGL is 4 times that of NI. These statistics are similar to the findings of Hodder et al. (2006) that volatility of FVI is almost 5 times the volatility of NI. 
Disclosure Measure
Construct of the disclosure measure required two types of decisions: (i) the medium of disclosure wherein to measure disclosure, and (ii) the items included in the disclosure index. I chose the annual report as the medium for measuring disclosure level for two reasons. First, prior research shows that the annual report disclosure level is positively correlated with the disclosure level provided through other media (Lang and Lundholm 1993). More importantly, fair value disclosure and risk disclosure for banks are released primarily through annual reports. The annual reports of banks are voluminous and complex. I do not attempt to distinguish between the mandatory and voluntary disclosure items. questions addressing quantitative and qualitative disclosure, and was broken down into the following 12 categories: capital structure, capital adequacy, market risk internal modeling, internal and external ratings, credit risk modeling, securitization activities, asset quality, credit derivatives and other credit enhancements, derivatives (other than credit derivatives), geographic and business line diversification, accounting and presentation policies, other risks (i.e., interest rate risk in the banking book, liquidity risk and operational risk). My disclosure measure is based on the disclosure survey used by Basel Committee (refer to Appendix A). 18 The positive aspects of using the Basel disclosure questionnaire are: a) It was the most comprehensive disclosure index specifically targeted at banks, and b) Disclosure items are not geared at any particular database, but can be implemented using annual report disclosure. The measure of disclosure I used is prone to criticism. It captures the existence of particular disclosure rather than the quality of that disclosure. Equal weighting of individual items may not reflect the actual weights assigned to the items by users of financial statements. Similarly, the disclosure measure does not capture the disclosure activities through avenues other than the annual reports. Coding of the disclosure items may be subjective. However, the main strength of the disclosure measure is that it is specifically designed for banks and is not a general index. This increases confidence that the disclosure measure captures what is intended.
Corporate Governance Measure
The two corporate governance measures used in this study are Industry CGQ and a measure of independence of the Board of Directors. I use the Industry CGQ computed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). CGQ is comprised of: (1) board structure and composition, (2) audit issues, (3) charter and by-law provisions, (4) laws of incorporation, (5) executive and director compensation, (6) qualitative factors (7) stock ownership, and (8) director education. There are a total of 61 underlying variables (Appendix B). All scores are relative (percentile basis). The ISS data have been used in several academic studies. 20 The Industry CGQ measure is a percentile score relative to the industry peer group based on the 24 S&P -GICS‖ (Global Industry Classification System) industry groups. ISS has considered the existing academic studies and tested each variable exhaustively against 16 performance metrics over three years.
ISS then tested each category to ensure the alignment of the weighting to create a rational possible corporate governance rating. The choice of governance variables and weights is driven by correlation with financial performance and risk mitigation. Larcker et al. (2007) point out that the apparent lack of construct validity and measurement issues for corporate governance measures is an issue in corporate governance research. In the absence of clear theory pointing out which corporate governance variables matter, any measures of corporate governance are subject to criticism. I attempt to address this concern by using one composite measure closely aligned to firm performance and risk mitigation, and a second single dimension measure directly linked to independence. In addition to CGQ, I use a simple measure of the percentage of independent directors on the board of directors. This measure has intuitive appeal.
Independence of board implies objective monitoring by the board. Also, prior empirical literature has shown links between an independence characteristic and accounting income attributes. members. Less than half of the boards are independent (75% and above directors are independent) in all three years.
Model and results
The structural model between disclosure, corporate governance and FVGL-returns association is depicted in Figure 1 . First, I measure the Association O in the figure 1 as the association between returns and FVGL. Second, to account for the association between disclosure and corporate governance and control for self selection, I estimate disclosure as a function of corporate governance and other determinants of disclosure (Association A in Figure 1 ). Third, I measure the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on FVGL-returns association (Association B and C in figure 1 ). Fourth, I combine the coefficients that measure Association A and Association B to document the indirect effect of corporate governance on FVGL-association via disclosures. 
FVGL-returns association
The change in BV is equal to NI plus OCI less dividends. The change in difference between the FV and BV is the FVGL. The dependent variable is converted to cum-dividend return by adding dividend to both the sides and deflating by the beginning of the year market value. I get the following estimation equation, as depicted by association O in figure 1 22 :
Returns (R t ) is the annual return over 12 months ending four months after the end of the financial period.
23 NI t is net income for the year t, OCI t is other comprehensive income and FVGL t is the fair value gains and losses after adjusting for tax at 35%. I discuss the results of this benchmark model in section 4.3 22 Another potential model was the model based on Easton and Harris (1991) incorporating both earnings levels and changes as explanatory variables for stock returns. However, the high correlation (0.72) between the FVI and ΔFVI in my sample precludes the implementation and interpretation of such a model. 23 I use the four months after the year end rather than the typical three months. This is because most of the banks in my sample file annual reports on the last day of the third month following the end of the fiscal year.
Association between disclosure and corporate governance
I estimate disclosure for two reasons. First, disclosure is endogenous. It is possible that firms that have a stronger FVGL-returns association disclose more information relating to risk management process. (1) Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that disclosure is higher for firms that perform well, for larger firms, for firms with a weaker relation between annual stock returns and earnings and for firms that issue securities. Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005) find that firms with more outside directors and greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue a forecast and are inclined to forecast more frequently.
Based on the results of Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) , I select ISSUE, ∆NI_X, ∆FVGL_X, SIZE and NUM_EST. In line with the model used in Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005) , I control for BMD, OWN and RISK. The variable definitions follow.
As explained in section 1, Disclosure (DIS) is measured as the disclosure score (DIP) computed using the BASEL index or DIPRANK, which is the percentile rank of the DIP. The two proxies for governance (GOV) are the CGQ and IND, which is an indicator variable=1 if the board has 75% or more independent outside directors. The variable ISSUE is 1 if the bank has a share or debt issue in the current or the following year and 0 otherwise. This variable captures the disclosure behavior motivated by the capital market transactions. SIZE is the average total assets measured at the beginning of the year. ∆NI_X and ∆FVGL_X capture extreme change in firm performance over the previous year. They are indicator variables equal to 1 if ∆NI and ∆FVGL are in the top or bottom decile of the sample; and 0 otherwise.
BMD is the ratio of book value to market value of equity for the firm. NUM_EST is the number of First Call analysts that issue earnings forecasts for the firm during the fiscal year. OWN is the percentage of the firm's common equity held by institutional investors (data from Thomson Financial). RISK is the one year interest rate gap computed from regulatory data.
Results are documented in Table 4 . The first two columns show the results of regressions using CGQ and two alternative measures for disclosure -DIP and DIPRANK for the percentage disclosure measure. The third and the fourth columns use the IND measure for corporate governance. The coefficient of corporate governance is positive and significant in all four regressions consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 3. The significance (and R-square) ranges from 1% (69%) for the model using DIP and CGQ to 1% for the model using DIPRANK and IND (33%). The coefficient on corporate governance is 0.02 (significant at 5%) for the model using DIP and CGQ measures. This suggests that firms with good corporate governance have a higher quality of disclosure. This is consistent with the finding of Beekes and Brown (2006) that well-governed firms have more informative disclosure.
Disclosure is increasing in capital market transactions, size of the bank and institutional ownership across all four regressions, and in risk in two of the four regressions, consistent with the Lang and Lundholm (1993, and Ajinkya et al. (2005) . The coefficient on extremity of NI is not significant in any of the models. This is not consistent with prior research. However, most of these prior studies used nonfinancial samples. The coefficient on the extremity of FVGL is not significant. This suggests that managers do not base the disclosure level on extremity of NI or extremity of FVGL for banks.
Overall results indicate that after controlling for other determinants of disclosure, Association A (measured by γ 1 ) as depicted in Figure 1 , and implemented empirically using equation (5) is positive and significant. This means that corporate governance is related strongly positively with disclosure. Despite the attempt to model the endogenous relation between disclosure and corporate governance, it is likely that in the absence of a reliable model, such controls are imperfect and there are other likely correlated omitted variables.
Direct effect of disclosure and corporate governance and FVGL-returns association
To test the direct effect of disclosure and corporate governance on FVGL, I implement the following model: 
(6)
While the association B in Figure 1 is measured by α 34 , the association C in Figure 1 is measured by α 35 in equation (6) 25 . The variable DIS is endogenous and, as a result it raises the possibility of that residual error in the returns regression in equation (6) 25 Corporate governance may affect the relationship between disclosure and FVGL-returns association. For example: Investors may view disclosures from well-governed firms to be more credible. Hence I conduct robustness check to test for the interaction between FVGL*GOV*DIS. The coefficient is positive, but not significant. 26 The Hausman (1978) test rejects exogeneity of disclosure with respect to the list of instruments described in section 4.2 at the 5% level. Consequently, I report results of regression equation (6) and (6A) using 2SLS. 
Empirical results are documented in Table 5 The results of model including the controls are shown in Table 6 . The first two columns use the CGQ measure for corporate governance and alternative measures for disclosure. The third and fourth columns use the IND measure for governance and alternative measures for disclosure. The interaction variable with disclosure is positive and significant in all four regressions (1% to 5%) consistent with the 27 The variables are mean-centered. Centering is critical to interpret the main variables but does not affect the coefficients on interaction. Robustness check reveals that results are similar for the interaction variables when variables are not centered. 28 The differences between NI, OCI and FVGL are on two aspects -disclosed vs. recognized and historical cost vs. fair value since NI and OCI include recognized FVGL. Since the data to separate the recognized FVGL component in NI and OCI are not available, I refrain from making direct comparison between the coefficients of NI, OCI and FVGL. prediction of hypothesis 1. The coefficient on the interaction between corporate governance and FVGL is not positive and significant in any of the four regressions. Therefore, there is no consistent evidence that corporate governance directly impacts the FVGL-returns association in support of hypothesis 2. The coefficient on control for loss is negative and significant. The coefficient on control for size is positive and significant. It suggests that size has a positive effect on FVGL-returns association. The coefficient on the interaction with risk suggests that risk has a positive effect on FVGL-returns association. The coefficient on the interaction with growth is not significant. Although some of these results (loss, size, and risk) may appear contradictory to prior findings, one has to remember that the controls suggested for recognized NI for non-financial sample may not have the predicted relation with disclosed FVGL, especially for a banking sample. For example, prior evidence suggests a negative relation between risk and NI-returns association. However, banks are in the business of taking risk. Thus, the existence of risk in the bank need not have a negative effect on FVGL-returns association, but will depend on whether the bank's risk position is value-enhancing or value-decreasing. Overall, results indicate that after controlling for other determinants of earnings-returns association, Association B (as depicted in Figure 1 and empirically implemented using equation 6 and 6A) is positive and significant, but Association C is not.
This suggests that disclosure impacts the FVGL-returns association positively, whereas corporate governance does not impact the FVGL-returns association directly.
Indirect effect of corporate governance on FVGL-returns association
Due to the potential link between corporate governance and disclosure, the effect of governance does not lend itself to easy interpretation and measurement. I use path analysis to measure the indirect effect of corporate governance on FVGL returns association.
29 I multiply the relevant coefficients from Figure 1 ). The detailed computations are in Panel B of Table 6 . The multiplicative coefficient (γ 1 *α 34 ) is positive and significant for all four sets of regressions (significance level 1% to 5 %). This suggests that the indirect effect of governance (through disclosure) is positive and significant across all four regressions consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2. The combined results of Table 4 and 6 suggest that disclosure positively impacts the FVGL-returns association, but corporate governance impacts the FVGL-returns association indirectly via disclosure.
Analysis by bank risk and robustness checks
Tests by specific disclosure of different types of risk
Banks are not homogenous in their activities, risk exposure or management of risk. They differ in the activities they specialize in, and as a result, the type of risk to which they are exposed. The risk exposure of banks includes exposure to market risk (a major component of which is interest rate risk), credit risk, liquidity risk, legal risk and operations risk. 30 The risk underlying the financial instruments reflects the activities of the bank. If a bank is primarily exposed to interest rate risk, disclosure relating to the modeling of interest rate risk such as internal models, stress testing, back testing procedures, and scenario analysis results may be more relevant than credit risk modeling disclosure. On the other hand, if the bank is exposed to high credit risk, market participants may be interested in credit risk measurement models, composition of loan portfolios, historical default experience, credit scoring policies, credit scoring models, etc. Similarly, if a bank is exposed to high derivatives risk, information relating to objectives and use of derivatives and credit derivatives, notional amounts, counterparty risk exposures, amounts of trading and non-trading derivatives may be useful to market participants. In addition to type, the extent of exposure is important. For example, if a bank is engaged in activities generating interest income but is almost perfectly hedged, then it may not be exposed to interest rate risk. I explore the role 30 Example: Bank of America that actively trades derivatives is exposed to higher risk (interest rate, credit risk or other depending on type of derivative) to the extent that it has unhedged exposure as compared to Arrow Financial Corp that does not engage in derivative activities. Citicorp , which predominantly has corporate clientele is exposed to higher credit risk than a smaller bank specializing in retail services. Banks are in the business of making interest income. The higher the interest income, the higher is their exposure to interest rate risk. One measure of interest rate risk is the ratio of net interest income to non-interest income in the bank. However, the proportion of interest income to non interest income across banks is similar in magnitude and lacks variation for my sample. This leads me to explore alternative measures of interest rate risk used in prior studies such as the one year interest rate gap (Hodder et al. 2006 ). I measure credit risk by loan type: the proportion of agricultural and commercial loans as a proportion of total loans. The logic underlying this construct is that the homogeneous nature of consumer loans facilitates statistical modeling. This renders more precise valuation of consumer loans. In contrast, commercial loans are heterogeneous and agricultural loans are high risk due to vagaries of nature. I measure derivatives risk using the total exposure (notional value) to derivatives. Although derivatives reported on the balance sheet at fair value are on an average a little over 2% of total assets, derivatives risk remains a high source of risk to banks because banks use derivatives for trading.
To test the effect of specific disclosure on a subset of banks which are exposed to high risk, I estimate the following model: SP_RISK it represents interest rate risk, credit risk and derivatives risk. Interest rate risk is the absolute value of the one year interest rate gap, computed based on Y9 data. Credit risk is the agricultural and commercial loans as % of total loans. Derivatives risk is the exposure to derivatives computed from Y9 data. SP_DIS it is the specific disclosure measure computed using the subgroups under the Basel index -interest rate modeling disclosure, credit risk modeling disclosure and derivatives risk modeling disclosure. Interest rate risk modeling disclosure is captured by subgroup (3). They include disclosures relating to portfolios covered by the bank's internal model, overview of policies and procedures for stress testing internal models and back testing internal models, summary quantitative information on market risk exposure, management of those risks, results of scenario analysis, the confidence level used for internal modeling, the holding period used for internal modeling, the observation period used for internal modeling, use of VAR and additional VAR data, etc. Credit risk modeling disclosure is measured using subgroup (5). They comprise disclosure relating to use of credit risk measurement models, and descriptive information about the models, such as portfolios covered and size of portfolios, incorporation of historical default experience in credit risk management, use of credit scoring is used when granting credit, description about the credit scoring model, use of stress tests to test counterparty credit exposures and related information among others. Subgroup (8) is used to compute derivatives risk modeling disclosure.
Some of the items included are disclosure relating to use of credit derivatives, strategy and objectives, notional amounts and fair value of credit derivatives, credit enhancement on counterparty credit exposures, amount of credit risk bought or sold using credit derivatives, breakdown of credit derivatives by type of instrument, gross positive market value of derivatives, gross negative market value of derivatives, summary information about the effect of non-trading derivatives on earnings of off-balance sheet (hedging) positions held by the organization, future potential exposures for derivatives. I implement the model in equation (7). Certain FVGL on financial assets and liabilities (such as derivatives, fair value hedges, trading investments and cash flow hedges) are included in NI and OCI.
Although I am interested in the coefficient on the interaction between SP_DIS, SP_RISK and FVGL, the disclosure may moderate the NI-returns and OCI-returns association as well. For interest rate risk, the coefficient on interaction of SP_DIS*SP_RISK is positive and significant for NI and FVGL suggesting that the interest rate modeling disclosure aids market participants in understanding the recognized (NI) and disclosed FVGL. When the risk under consideration is credit risk, the coefficient on interaction with SP_DIS*SP_RISK is positive and significant only for FVGL. This may be due to FVGL on loans being largely disclosed (except credit derivatives) rather than recognized and thus, a part of FVGL rather than NI or OCI in the model. For derivatives risk and derivatives modeling disclosure, the coefficient on interaction with SP_DIS*SP_RISK, is positive and significant only for FVGL. This suggests that the derivatives modeling disclosure aid market participants in interpreting the off-balance sheet derivatives in context of the risk management activities of the bank. Overall the results suggest that specific disclosure matter by type of risk consistent with the predictions of hypothesis 4a, 4b and 4c. Interest rate risk modeling disclosure, credit risk modeling disclosure, and derivatives risk modeling disclosure impact the FVGL returns relation positively for banks exposed to relatively higher interest rate risk, credit risk, and derivatives risk respectively. 31 31 To rule out the possibility that results relating to specific disclosure and specific risk are driven by the proxies, I implement all tests with alternative measures for some of the specific risks and disclosure. I measure interest rate risk as the proportion of interest income to total average assets, and credit risk as the proportion of substandard loans to total loans. I use disclosure relating to internal ratings and securitization combined with disclosure relating to credit risk modeling to build a more comprehensive measure of credit risk modeling disclosure. All results remain qualitatively similar.
Robustness check
Validation of disclosure measure and governance measure
The underlying theme in this paper is that the effectiveness of the risk management process is revealed through disclosure and governance structure. Hodder et al. (2006) show the volatility of FVI is positively related to market model beta, the standard deviation in the stock returns and long-term interestrate beta. Hence, I use the volatility of the FVI (includes NI, OCI and FVGL) as a proxy for the effectiveness of the risk management process in order to check the validity of this premise. I measure volatility of the FVI for the period 1995-2005 for each bank in my sample (I require at least five years of data). Banks are in the business of assuming risk and big banks typically have higher appetite for risk reflected in the complex range of products and services that they deal in. Therefore, I rank the volatility of the FVI by size terciles. The ranked volatility measure has a negative correlation of -0.30 at 1% significance level with DIP and -2.11 at 1% significance level with CGQ.
FVI-returns association
I conduct additional analysis to test whether disclosure and corporate governance have an effect on the FVI-returns relation. FVI, which includes NI, OCI and disclosed FVGL, is the income measure closest to earnings under a complete fair value model, as of now. Empirical evidence (untabulated) confirms that disclosure and corporate governance (indirect) have a positive and significant effect on the FVI-returns association.
Principal Component Analysis
The disclosure measure in this paper is aggregated on a rich set of disclosure using equal weighting (92 items under 11 categories). Aggregation potentially leads to loss of information. Additionally, equal weighting of individual items may not represent the real weighting assigned by market participants in evaluating this disclosure. To alleviate some of these concerns, I use principal component analysis (PCA) to determine which of the sub categories is significant by themselves. PCA reveals two significant factors with Eigen values greater than one. The top 3 factor loadings in the number one principal factor aremarket risk modeling disclosure, derivatives disclosure and accounting polices disclosure. I use the raw scores for these three categories in place of the original aggregate disclosure score.
32 Results (untabulated) show the coefficient on the interaction between FVGL and disclosure remains positive and significant (lowest significance being 10%) across all measures of disclosure and corporate governance.
Conclusion
Although this study focuses on investors, who are just one group of users of fair value and ignores potential contracting and regulatory implications of fair value estimates, this is the first study to explain the cross-sectional variation in the market's perception of the quality of fair value estimates as a function of the quality of the risk management process in a bank revealed through disclosure and corporate governance. 33 I find that disclosure positively moderates the FVGL-returns association, whereas the effect of corporate governance is more subtle, and is evidenced indirectly through the medium of disclosure.
The results are robust to control variables such as risk, loss, growth and firm size. Analysis relating to specific disclosure reveals that the FVGL-return association is increasing in interest rate risk disclosure, credit risk disclosure and derivatives disclosure for banks that are exposed to those risks. I conclude that overall results suggest disclosure aids market participants directly in evaluating fair values, whereas corporate governance aids market participants indirectly. In the future, the enhanced estimation sensitivity 32 I do not use the PCA scores in place of aggregate disclosures since the individual factor loadings on the principal factors do not exceed 0.5 in both the principal factors. 33 For a detailed discussion relating to ‗value relevance' metric refer to Holthausen & Watts (2001) and Barth et al. (2001) The benchmark model in this paper without the conditioning variables (disclosure and corporate governance) confirms the findings of prior literature that the FVGL-returns association is not significant. Callen, Hope and Segal (2005) and Callen (2007) argue that the coefficient of the earnings component in a returns model presents only one dimension of the -information content‖ of an earnings component. One earnings component may have lower persistence than another and therefore the sensitivity of the returns to the earnings component may be low. But, if the former is more volatile than the latter, it may still do a better job of explaining returns. Hodder et al. (2006) documents that the volatility of changes in fair values is high and reflects risk which is priced by the market. Taken together, these results suggest that although the FVGL-returns association is not significant, the shocks to changes in fair values are high.
Therefore, changes in fair values may still be a significant factor in driving stock returns. Future research using an alternative complementary methodology such as variance decomposition that incorporates both the sensitivity of returns to FVGL, as well as volatility of FVGL, may provide further insights relating to its valuation. 
Appendix A Variables underlying the Disclosure Measure
The disclosure measure is based on the disclosure questionnaire used by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). The items included in the disclosure measure are:
(1) Capital Structure 1. Issuance of capital through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 2. Key "trigger" events 3. Amount of common shareholders' equity 4. Step3: Estimate association C (α 35 ) controlling for disclosure. A significant coefficient would suggest that corporate governance has a positive and direct effect on the FVGL-returns association.
Step4: Combine results of Association A and B (γ 1 *α 34 ) and test significance using Sobel test. (6) is positive and significant H2: α35 in equation (6) is positive and significant H3: γ1 in equation (5) is positive and significant H4: γ1* α34 is positive and significant Association B α34 in equation (6) Association A γ1 in equation (5) Association C α35 in equation (6) Association O Φ3in equation 4 Nomination Committee comprised solely of independent outside directors and board can hire its own advisors 23% 57% 62%
Variables weighted heavily in CGQ
The audit committee is comprised solely of independent outsiders 41% 62% 84% The average annual burn rate over the past three fiscal years is greater than 2% and exceeds one standard deviation of the industry mean NA NA 9%
One or more of the audit committee members are financial experts NA NA 79% Board controlled by a supermajority of independent outsiders (IO > 90%) 26% 14% 17% Board has only one non-independent director 8% 8% 7% Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements 7% 7% 7% Board controlled by a supermajority of independent outsiders (75% < IO <= 90%) 34% 37% 32% Incorporation in state without any state anti-takeover provisions 8% 8% 0% 
Panel B: Indirect effect of Corporate Governance through Disclosure
This table reports the computation and significance of the indirect effect of corporate governance via disclosure based on results in Table 5 to table 8 . Association A is the relation between disclosure and corporate governance. Association B is the direct effect of disclosure on FVGL-returns (or FVGL-returns) association.
Source Table 6 FVGL 0.14** 0.07 0.003** Table 4 DIPRANK CGQ 0.23*** 0.05 Table 6 FVGL 0.01** 0.01 0.002** Table 4 DIP IND 0.09** 0.04 F statistic N *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, * denotes significance at 10%. Standard errors (SE) are comput ed clustered on firm and year fixed effects are included (untabulated). Variables are defined in the Appendix C.
